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Stewart v. Smith
122 S. Ct. 2578 (2002)
In Stezwut v SniW the United States Supreme Court evaluated when state
law grounds for review are adequate and independent of federal law.2 Respon-
dent Robert Douglas Smith ("Smith") was convicted of first-degree murder,
kidnapping, and sexual assault. He was sentenced to death on the murder charge,
and then filed a series of unsuccessful petitions for post-conviction relief in state
court.' The state court ruled that Smith's ineffective assistance of counsel claim
had been waived pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3)
because he had not raised a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in two
previous appeals." Smith then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the District of Arizona, claiming, among other
things, that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance during the
sentencing phase of his trial.' The district court denied the petition.6 The district
court held that the state court's ruling was independent of federal law.7 The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision!
The United States Supreme Court then reversed the Ninth Circuit's ruling and
affirmed the district court's order.9
The Supreme Court held that, because the state court found the waiver
without looking to the merits of the claim, the state court's procedural finding
was independent of federal law.'0 The Court distinguished whether the waiver
required the state court to look to the merits of the case itself or "merely upon
the particular right alleged to have been violated."" The Court, in order to
ascertain which method the state court employed, certified a question to the
Supreme Court of Arizona. 2 The Supreme Court of Arizona held that the
1. 122 S. C. 2578 (2002).
2. Stewart v. Smith, 122 S. . 2578 (2002).
3. Id at 2580.
4. Id; ARIZ. R.QwvLL R P. 322(a(3) (readngin pertinent part that a "defendant shall be
precluded from relief," if his grounds or relief have "been waived at triA, on appeal, or in any
colateral proceeding").
5. 28 U.S.C SS 2241, 2254 (2000).





11. Id at 2581.
12. Sm-4 122 S. Q. at 2581. The Court asked, " ]Id the question whether an asserted
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waiver finding only required categorization of the particular right to be
evaluated. 13  Thus, the United States Supreme Court concluded that Rule
32.2(a) (3) determinations in Arizona are independent of federal law because they
do not depend upon the merits of a federal constitutional ruling. 4
Conversely, the Court also found that if the state court had looked primarily
to the merits of Smith's case, the state court's ruling would then be dependent
on federal law."' The Ninth Circuit came to the conclusion that the state court
looked primarily at the merits of Smith's case. 6 However, the state court's
finding that Smith's reason for defaulting his claim was deficient had little to do
with the underlying claim of ineffective counsel'
This case is pertinent to Virginia because the procedural default rules in
Virginia and Arizona are similar. Rule 32.2(a) (3) states that a "defendant shall be
precluded from relief" if his grounds for relief have "been waived at trial, on
appeal, or in anyprevious collateral proceeding.""8 The Court's ruling in Steum
rested on the Supreme Court of Arizona's interpretation that a Rule 32.2(a)(3)
inquirydid not require looking to the merits of the case." In Virginia, Rule 5:25
of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia "sets the foundation for proce-
dural default in Virginia capital cases."20 Rule 5:25 states that error will not be
sustained "unless the objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time
of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable this Court to attain the
ends of justice."2' Virginia's procedural default rule generally will not require an
evaluation of the merits of the case involving a "good cause" because that inquiry
looks only at the reason for the default rather than looking at its effect.2 Con-
versely, when the Virginia court has considered and rejected default under the
"ends of justice" exception, the inquiry generally will involve the merits of the
claim was of 'sufficient constitutional magnitude' to require a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
waiver for purposes of Rule 32.2(a)(3), depend upon the merits of the articular claim, or merely
upon the particular right to have been viote& Id (citatio oitted
13. Stewart v. Smith, 46 P.3d 1067, 1068 (Ariz. 2002) (en banc).
14. Swu, 122 S. CL at 2581.
15. Id
16. Id;seeSmithv. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1191,1196-97(9th CAr. 2001). The Ninth rcuit found
that the state court did not clearly and explicitly invoke a procedural rule as the basis for its ruling.
Therefore, federal review was not bared. Snikh, 241 F.3d at 1196-97.
17. St wt, 122 S. 0. at 2581. Smith defaulted due to his failure to argue ineffective
assistance of counsel in two previous appeals. He argued that this was caused by his attorney's
conflict of interest with the Public Defender's Office. The state court ruled that the public defender
had no loyalty conflict between his client and his employer, and was thus an insufficient ground for
waiver. Id at 2581-82.
18. ARIZ. R. GM. P. 32.2(a)(3).
19. S-=74 122 S. Ct. at 2581.
20. Matthew K. Mahoney, Byi*tg the A i D1'adt OCzn; 12 CAP. DEF. J. 305, 307
(2000); VA. S. Cr. X 5:25.




claim 3" It would be nearly impossible for a court to decide the justness of
applying the procedural default rule without looking at the issue procedurallyand
factually to determine whether the waived issue would have made a significant
difference.
C Blaine Elliott
23. See id
2002]

